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 EVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION: THE REMEDIAL 
SMORGASBORD FOR MISLEADING CONDUCT IN 
AUSTRALIA 
Elise Bant* and Jeannie Marie Paterson** 
ABSTRACT 
In Australia, the revolutionary Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
introduced, in section 52, a simple and powerful prohibition on conduct in 
trade or commerce that is “misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or 
deceive.”  The prohibition applies to business-to-business transactions as 
well as to those involving consumers and contains no requirement of fault on 
the part of the contravenor. Its purposes are explicitly instrumental: to protect 
consumers and promote fair business practices. The Act also introduced a 
veritable ‘smorgasbord’ of remedies for victims of misleading conduct that 
were equally revolutionary, granting to courts a wide-ranging remedial 
discretion to award relief that includes, for example, the power to vary 
contracts retroactively. The prohibition and its remedial scheme have proven 
enormously influential, having been re-enacted, replicated and repeated 
dozens of times in different contexts under various Australian state and 
federal legislation. As a result, they reach into almost every corner of 
commercial life and dominate the litigation landscape. This paper will argue 
that this dominance has led the remedial scheme (including in its modern 
incarnation under the Australian Consumer Law) to have a very significant 
and ongoing “gravitational influence” on the evolution of analogous common 
law and equitable remedies and, indeed, the wholesale understanding of the 
relationship between right and remedy in Australian law and practice. The 
analysis has implications for the broader theory and practice of the law of 
remedies that go well beyond the borders of Australian law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE NOVEL AUSTRALIAN PRIVATE LAW 
LANDSCAPE 
The law of remedies in Australian private law has been profoundly 
affected by a suite of expansive and novel statutory schemes that were 
introduced for explicitly instrumental ends.1 The Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth) (TPA) and its successor, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
(CCA), have the purposes of enhancing “the welfare of Australians through 
the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for consumer 
protection.”2 A key weapon in the scheme as originally conceived was TPA 
section 52, now section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), which is 
in schedule 2 of the CCA. This provision revolutionised Australian private 
law by prohibiting conduct in trade or commerce that was “misleading or 
deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive.” Unlike many of its general law 
counterparts concerned with remedying misleading conduct,3 the statutory 
 
1  In addition to those canvassed in this paper, see, e.g., Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 12DA, 12DB, 12DC, 12DF. These provisions are modelled on the 
Australian Consumer Law, contained in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2. Prohibitions 
on misleading conduct are also found in a wide range of other statutes including the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) (Austl.) and more specific federal and state counterparts such as under the various food and 
retail tenancies acts. 
2 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 2 (Austl.); Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 2 
(Austl.). 
3 The surrounding general law context is complex and extensive, embracing contractual doctrines 
concerning warranties and duties of disclosure, torts such as deceit, negligent misstatement, injurious 
falsehood, passing off and defamation, rescission for fraudulent misrepresentation and the equitable 
doctrines of estoppel, misrepresentation and rescission and, in some contexts, breach of fiduciary duty. 
For some of the interesting insights from consideration of this overlap, see Elise Bant & Jeannie M. 
Paterson, Should Specifically Deterrent or Punitive Remedies Be Made Available to Victims of Misleading 
Conduct Under the Australian Consumer Law?, 25 TORTS L.J. 99 (2019) [hereinafter Should Specifically 
Deterrent or Punitive Remedies Be Made Available]; Elise Bant & Jeannie M. Paterson, Estoppel, 
Misleading Conduct and Equitable Fraud, 13 J. EQUITY 183 (2019) [hereinafter Estoppel, Misleading 
Conduct and Equitable Fraud]; Elise Bant & Jeannie M. Paterson, Exploring the Boundaries of 
Compensation for Misleading Conduct: The Role of Restitution Under the ACL, 41(2) SYDNEY L. REV. 
155 (2019) [hereinafter Exploring the Boundaries of Compensation for Misleading Conduct]; Elise Bant 
& Jeannie M. Paterson, Misleading Conduct Before the Federal Court: Achievements and Challenges, in 
THE FEDERAL COURT’S CONTRIBUTION TO AUSTRALIAN LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 165, 166–77 
(Pauline Ridge & James Stellios eds., 2018) [hereinafter Misleading Conduct Before the Federal Court]; 
Elise Bant & Jeannie Paterson, Limitations on Defendant Liability for Misleading or Deceptive Conduct 
Under Statute: Some Insights from Negligent Misstatement, in LAW OF MISSTATEMENTS: 50 YEARS ON 
FROM HEDLEY BYRNE V HELLER 159 (Kit Barker et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Limitations on Defendant 
Liability for Misleading or Deceptive Conduct under Statute]; Jeannie M. Paterson & Elise Bant, In the 
Age of Statutes, Why Do We Still Turn to the Common Law Torts?: Lessons from the Statutory Prohibitions 
on Misleading Conduct in Australia, 23(2) TORTS L.J. 139 (2016) [hereinafter In the Age of Statutes, Why 
Do We Still Turn to the Common Law Torts?]. 
2020] Evolution and Revolution 27 
prohibition is strict: it may be contravened by conduct that is unintentionally 
misleading.4 Consistently with its protective aims, the ACL empowers 
regulators to monitor and bring actions in cases of alleged contravention of 
the statutory norm simpliciter, that is without proof of loss or damage having 
been suffered by any person as a result of its breach.5 If the claim is sustained, 
the ACL provides for the award of penalties for specific forms of misleading 
conduct6 and other enforcement powers designed to deter both the breaching 
party and others in like positions from engaging in misleading or deceptive 
conduct.  
Private plaintiffs may also seek relief in respect of loss or damage 
suffered as a result of contravention of the statutory prohibition, but the ACL 
does not make caused loss a condition of defendant liability.7 Where loss is 
suffered, the statute provides extensive private rights of redress for victims 
of misconduct, supported by a veritable remedial “smorgasbord.”8 Thus, 
pursuant to the remedial scheme, courts may award damages for “loss or 
damage” caused by misleading conduct pursuant to TPA section 82 (ACL 
section 236), but also have capacity to make wide-ranging discretionary and 
compensatory orders under TPA section 87 (ACL sections 237 and 243).   
By omitting intention as an element of the statutory prohibition and 
opening up a potent range of remedies for victims of misleading conduct, the 
regime builds upon, and consciously goes beyond, its surrounding general 
law context. For example, as we will see below, the statute empowers courts 
not only to order common law-like remedies such as compensatory damages, 
rescission, restitutionary, and proprietary relief, but also to vary contracts 
where required in the view of the court to prevent or reduce loss or damage 
caused by misleading conduct9—something definitely not found in the 
traditional, common law arsenal of responses to misleading conduct. On the 
other hand, while the statutory prohibition is strict, courts have recognized 
that questions of culpability and relative fault properly and significantly 
 
4 As Gibbs CJ said in Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 1a IPR 684, 
688 (Austl.): “The liability imposed by s. 52 . . . is thus quite unrelated to fault . . . .” See also Yorke v 
Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661, 666 (Mason ACJ, Wilson, Deane, and Dawson JJ) (Austl.) (“Even though a 
corporation acts honestly and reasonably, it may nonetheless engage in conduct that is misleading or 
deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.”). 
5 See Hornsby Building Info Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Info Centre Ltd (1978) 1b IPR 818, 
824; Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 (Austl.). If a plaintiff 
does seek compensation, must a court assess what loss or damage has arisen “because” of the defendant’s 
conduct. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 ss 236(1)(a), 237(1)(a), 238(1) (Austl.). 
6 See, e.g., Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 ss 29–34 (Austl.). 
7 Competition and Consumer Law (Cth) sch 2 s 237 (Austl.); see also ACCC v TPG Internet Pty 
Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640, 655 [49], 656–57 [54] (French CJ, Crennan, Bell & Keane JJ) (Austl.); Campbell 
v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304, 318 [24] (French CJ) (Austl.). 
8 Akron Sec Ltd v Iliffe (1997) 41 NSWLR 353, 364 (Mason P) (Austl.). 
9 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 92(2) (Austl.); Competition and Consumer Act (Cth) sch 2 s 
243 (Austl.). 
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inform the award of relief in claims for private redress. In this sphere, 
guidance from neighboring doctrines such as deceit and negligent 
misstatement have proven of assistance in drawing boundaries on 
defendants’ scope of liability for misleading conduct.10 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL LAW AND 
STATUTORY REMEDIES 
One might be forgiven for assuming that the powerful prohibition and 
its accompanying remedial regime (the “scheme”) would render redundant 
the cognate common law and equitable claims directed at remedying 
misleading conduct.11 This outcome may be considered all the  more 
inevitable, once it is appreciated that the scheme is not limited to consumer 
transactions but extends to business-to-business transactions. Moreover, the 
scheme is repeated and replicated, in more or less similar formats, across 
literally dozens of general and specific pieces of legislation. Thus, it now 
covers virtually every aspect of commercial intercourse.12 But this 
anticipated redundancy of related common law doctrines and principles has 
not occurred.13 Rather, Australian law has gradually shifted to see increased 
reference and interaction between the related common law and statutory law. 
This interaction paves the way towards an increasingly holistic and integrated 
landscape in the law governing misleading conduct.  
The need to locate the statutory scheme within its broader legal 
landscape has been encouraged and, indeed, necessitated by the principle-
based legislative design underpinning the regime. The core provisions are 
expressed in open-ended language that echo (but do not necessarily mirror) 
legal and equitable concepts and are left largely undefined in the statute. 
Thus, the central prohibition on misleading conduct is supported by a 
remedial scheme that provides for a wide range of orders designed to 
“compensate,” “prevent or reduce” “loss or damage” suffered “because of” 
“conduct that is misleading or deceptive.”14 None of these terms are defined 
in the legislation. This has led courts to draw upon common law and equitable 
 
10 Limitations on Defendant Liability for Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Under Statute, supra 
note 3. 
11 See, e.g., Mylton Burns, Has s 52 of the TPA Rendered Negligent Misstatement Irrelevant to 
Australian Professional Indemnity Insurance for “Advice Professionals”, 2001 12(2) INS. L. J. 121; Peter 
Gillies, Actions for Breach of s 52 and for Negligent Misstatement at Common Law—Some Observations 
on Their Relative Competitiveness, 2003 11(1) COMPETITION & CONSUMER L.J. 43. 
12 See, e.g., Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 12DA, 12DB, 
12DC, 12DF. These provisions are modelled on the ACL, contained in schedule 2 of the CCA. Prohibitions 
on misleading conduct are also found in a wide range of other statutes including the Corporations Act and 
more specific federal and state counterparts such as under the various food and retail tenancies acts. 
13 In the Age of Statutes, Why Do We Still Turn to the Common Law Torts, supra note 3. 
14 See ACL ss 236–69. 
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doctrines and remedies to the extent that they are consistent with, and 
promote, the language and protective purpose of the statute.15 Thus, as we 
will see below, courts have drawn on a range of torts and equitable doctrines 
for guidance on the meaning and measure of “loss or damage” under section 
236. Beyond compensatory awards, courts have also consistently held that 
the equitable principles of rescission provide safe, if not exclusive, guidance 
for statutory orders that set aside transactions induced by misleading 
conduct.16  
Conversely, the common practice of pleading both the statutory 
prohibition and its neighboring general law causes of action have seen the 
statute exert its own influence on the evolution of analogous common law 
and equitable principles and remedies in Australia. A good example of the 
creative potential of this form of “gravitational” influence is Vadasz v 
Pioneer Concrete (SA) Party Ltd,17 where the High Court of Australia, in a 
unanimous judgment, drew upon a number of authorities on cognate statutory 
fields to support its view that equity permitted partial rescission of a contract. 
This form of remedial flexibility is clearly permitted under the ACL.18 
Another example is in the fractured field of common law and equitable 
reliance-based estoppels. Australian courts have yet to commit to developing 
a more rational and unified model of these doctrines, which reconsiders the 
current, highly formal doctrinal distinctions imposed on this field in light of 
more substantive questions of principle and policy.19  Nonetheless, some first 
steps have been taken.20 There is a reasonable argument in favor of the view 
that the surrounding and pervasive statutory context not only encourages but 
demands judicial engagement with this task, if the law is to develop in a 
coherent and integrated fashion.21 
In Re Demagogue, Gummow J identified the nature of the challenge: 
 
15 See, e.g., Elna Australia Pty Ltd v. Int’l Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd [No 2] (1987) 16 FCR 
410, 417–18 (Gummow J); Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494, 529 [103] 
(Gummow J); Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459, 470 [18] (Gleeson CJ). For an examination of the 
nuanced interpretive process, see Limitations on Defendant Liability for Misleading or Deceptive Conduct 
under Statute, supra note 3. 
16 See, e.g., Tenji v Henneberry & Assocs Pty Ltd (2000) 98 FCR 324, 329–30 [12] (French J) 
(Austl.); Marks (1998) 196 CLR at 535 [116] (Gummow J); Munchies Mgmt Pty Ltd v Belperio (1988) 
58 FCR 274, 288 (Fisher, Gummow and Lee JJ) (Austl.). 
17 Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 102 (Austl.). 
18 Indeed, the statutory scheme permits the court to make orders “varying” a contract: Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87(2)(b) (Austl.); ACL s 243(b).  
19 For further consideration, see Elise Bant & Michael Bryan, Fact, Future and Fiction: Risk and 
Reasonable Reliance in Estoppel, 2015 35(3) OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 427. 
20 See, e.g., Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 (Austl.); EK Nominees 
Pty Ltd v Woolworths Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1172 (Austl.); see also Vasue v Lubo Medich Holdings [2008] 
NSWSC 899 [53]–[56] (White J) (Austl.); ACN 074 971 109 (as tr for the Argot Unit Tr) v Nat’l Mut Life 
Ass’n of Australasia Ltd [2006] VSC 507 [762] (Redlich J) (Austl.). 
21 See Estoppel, Misleading Conduct and Equitable Fraud, supra note 3. 
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As Professor Finn has pointed out, s 52 of the [Trade 
Practices] Act epitomises both the encroachment by statute 
upon areas previously left to the general law and the 
challenge which now exists to bring into relative harmony 
with the body of case-law construing s 52, general law 
doctrines whose deficiencies (for example, as to the legal 
consequences of pre-contractual statements) this case law 
has exposed: Finn, “Statutes And The Common Law” (1992) 
22 UWA L Rev 7 at 11, 25 . . .22 
The need for ongoing consideration of the potential for rational 
development and integration of common law and statutory principle has of 
late been underlined by the High Court’s repeated statements concerning the 
overriding principle of coherence.23 While that concept has yet to be fully 
articulated, there is little doubt that it encompasses the need to consider the 
interactions and “fit” between statutory and common law principles.24 And 
given the ubiquity of the statutory prohibitions on misleading conduct, the 
structure and substance of those schemes form a puissant background to any 
discussion of the nature and operation of common law remedies. 
III. KEY FEATURES OF THE STATUTORY REMEDIES FOR 
MISLEADING CONDUCT 
There are some striking features of the statutory scheme which arguably 
have profound implications for the wider law of remedies in Australia. 
 
22 Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31, 6 (Austl.). 
23 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498, 518, 520, 523 (Austl.); Miller v Miller (2011) 
242 CLR 446, 454 (Austl.). 
24 The literature is now extensive, but some influential examples include (in chronological order): 
Paul Finn, Statutes and the Common Law, 22 W. AUSTL. L. REV. 7 (1992); Jack Beatson, Has the Common 
Law a Future?, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J.  291, 300 (1997); WILLIAM GUMMOW, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: 
STATUTE, EQUITY, AND FEDERALISM (Oxford Univ. Press 1999); Jack Beatson, The Role of Statute in the 
Development of Common Law Doctrine, 117 L.Q. REV. 247 (2001); Paul Finn, Statutes and the Common 
Law: The Continuing Story, in INTERPRETING STATUTES 52 (Suzanne Corcoran & Stephen Bottomley 
eds., 2005); Joachim Dietrich, What Is “Lawyering”? The Challenge of Taxonomy, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
549 (2006); Stephen Gageler, Common Law Statutes and Judicial Legislation: Statutory Interpretation as 
a Common Law Process, 37 MONASH U. L. REV. 1 (2011); Andrew Burrows, The Relationship Between 
Common Law and Statute in the Law of Obligations, 128 L.Q. REV. 232 (2012); Mark Leeming, Theories 
and Principles Underlying the Development of the Common Law—The Statutory Elephant in the Room, 
36 UNSW L.J. 1002 (2013); DAVID WRIGHT, COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF STATUTES: THE EQUITY OF 
THE STATUTE (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2015); Elise Bant, Statute and Common Law: Interaction and 
Influence in Light of Principle of Coherence, 38 UNSW L.J. 367 (2015); Anthony Mason, A Judicial 
Perspective on the Development of Common Law Doctrine in the Light of Statute Law, in THE COMMON 
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: DIVERGENCE AND UNITY 119 (Andrew Robertson & Michael Tilburty eds., 2016); 
Ross Grantham & Darryn Jensen, Coherence in the Age of Statutes, 42 MONASH U. L. REV. 360 (2016). 
The critical nature of the enquiry in the “age of statutes” was examined, and the term coined in GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163–67 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1982). 
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However, we consider that they may well also offer valuable insights for 
other jurisdictions, including for debates over fundamental issues such as the 
relationship between right and remedy, as well as the role and content of 
judicial discretion. This section will first outline these key features before 
turning, in the final section, to consider their broader implications. 
A. Section 236 Damages 
As a section that entitles a plaintiff as of right25 to monetary 
compensation for loss caused by misleading conduct, section 236 
traditionally has been the first port of call for plaintiffs seeking pecuniary 
relief under the ACL for contravention of the prohibition of misleading or 
deceptive conduct: 
236 Actions for damages 
(1)   If: 
(a)   a person (the claimant) suffers loss or damage because 
of the conduct of another person; and 
(b)   the conduct contravened a provision of Chapter 2 [which 
includes the prohibition on misleading conduct] or 3; the 
claimant may recover the amount of the loss or damage by 
action against that other person, or against any person 
involved in the contravention. 
The meaning of “loss or damage” under section 236 is undefined in the 
ACL. However, as we have explained elsewhere, Australian courts have risen 
to the challenge of its interpretation by drawing on cognate general law 
concepts to the extent that they are consistent with and promote the particular 
statutory language and purpose.26 When thinking about potential forms of 
loss or damage, the laws of contract and tort provide different (albeit not 
exhaustive)27 paradigms for the law’s response to misleading conduct. Both 
commonly provide remedies for misleading conduct: in contract where the 
misrepresentation is incorporated into the agreement, and in tort through a 
raft of claims including deceit, negligent misstatement, defamation, passing 
off and injurious falsehood. Equitable doctrines also frequently operate in the 
 
25 Remedies (including compensation) that may be available at the discretion of the court pursuant 
to sections 237 and 243 of the ACL, and the different conceptions of “loss or damage” the subject of those 
sections, are addressed in the following section. 
26 See Misleading Conduct Before the Federal Court, supra note 3, at 165. 
27 As Gummow J has observed, it is an error to think that “tort and contract compris[e] the universe 
of analogues offered by the general law in s 52 cases.” Elna Australia Pty Ltd v. Int’l Computers 
(Australia) Pty Ltd [No 2] (1987) 16 FCR 410; see also GIO Australia Holdings Ltd v Marks (1996) 70 
FCR 559, 582–83. On the gain-based remedial analogues beyond rescission and restitution for misleading 
conduct, see also Should Specifically Deterrent or Punitive Remedies Be Made Available, supra note 3, at 
99. 
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context of, and provide relief for, misleading conduct, through the doctrines 
of estoppel, misrepresentation, rescission and breach of fiduciary duty.28 
Given the rich panoply of evolved general law doctrines that respond to 
misleading conduct in all its varieties,29 the task is to determine which of 
these general law doctrines best aligns with, and promotes, the statutory 
language and purpose. Some brief examples may illustrate this point. 
It is well understood in the law of contract that expectation damages are 
a form of normative, rather than factual, loss.30 Expectation damages make 
sense in a context where the legal order demands that contracts must be 
performed.31 Where a misleading contractual warranty (for example, as to 
profit) has been breached, a plaintiff’s dashed expectation of gain caused by 
the proscribed conduct constitutes “loss” because the plaintiff not only 
expected the profit but was entitled to it.  
By contrast, section 18 of the ACL does not demand that parties should 
perform their promises or make true their representations. The statute 
requires that defendants should not engage in misleading or deceptive 
conduct. This suggests that, without loss of profit to which the plaintiff was 
entitled, the only loss suffered in cases of misleading or deceptive conduct 
relating to profitability, for example, is the disappointment of shattered 
hopes.  
Consistently with this analysis, Australian courts have concluded that 
the statutory measure is the extent to which a plaintiff is left “worse off” by 
reference to the “actual” loss suffered as a result of misleading conduct.32 
This sum is usually calculated in terms of “reliance loss,” by analogy with 
the torts of deceit33 and negligent misstatement.34 However, courts have also 
noted that, on the language of the statute, plaintiff reliance is not required. 
 
28 See Elna (1987) 16 FCR 410. 
29 Fiduciary law, for example, frequently raises the issue of misleading silence when a fiduciary 
fails to disclose and obtain informed consent for a breach of fiduciary duty. 
30 L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 46 YALE 
L.J. 52, 53 (1936). 
31 Clark v Macourt (2013) 253 CLR 1, 7 (Austl.) (discussing the nature of expectation damages 
in contract); see also Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494, 504: 
[O]nce it is appreciated that, for the purposes of the law of contract “expectation” loss signifies the 
loss of a valuable right, namely, the contractual promise, it is irrelevant and quite misleading to ask 
whether, in the case of misleading and deceptive conduct under s 52 of the Act, ss 82 and 87 allow 
for “expectation” loss or “consequential” loss. It is irrelevant, because, if the misrepresentation is 
not contractual, there can be no loss of a contractual promise. 
32 See Gates v City Mut Life Assurance Soc’y Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1, 12 (Austl.); Marks (1998) 
196 CLR 494. 
33 See Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG & B Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 281, 291 (Austl.); Kenny & Good Pty 
Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413, 460–61 (Austl.). 
34 See Gates (1986) 160 CLR at 11. The law of negligent misstatement has perhaps been under-
utilized by courts to date. See Limitations on Defendant Liability for Misleading or Deceptive Conduct 
Under Statute, supra note 3, at 172. 
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Rather, the statute demands that the damage has been suffered “because of” 
the misconduct: a requirement of causation.35 Thus, the prohibition also 
captures loss or damage caused by third parties relying on a defendant’s 
misleading conduct, with the consequence that the plaintiff suffers loss. An 
example is where the defendant makes misleading statements about the 
plaintiff competitor’s products or business, resulting in diversion of custom 
from the plaintiff to the defendant’s business. Here, the torts of injurious 
falsehood, defamation and passing on have also proven valuable resources to 
guide the operation of the statute.36 Whichever analogical route is taken, it 
seems clear that the disappointment of shattered hopes arising from a 
misrepresentation as to profitability may be compensated not through 
expectation damages but, at best,37 as a type of distress damage.38 The result 
of this interactive reasoning is a better understanding of the nature of harm 
and compensation within an integrated legal system comprising common 
law, equity and statute.  
B. Sections 237–39 and 243: Rescission and the Remedial 
Smorgasbord 
Turning to sections 237–39 of the ACL, these provisions arm courts with 
the discretion to make a wide range of creative orders to remedy misleading 
conduct,39 illustrations of which are set out in section 243. Section 243 of the 
ACL, which replicates the earlier provision under section 87 of the TPA, 
provides a non-exhaustive list of the kinds of orders that may be made: 
 
35 See Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304, 351 (Austl.); see also 
Caason Invs Pty Ltd v Cao (2015) 236 FCR 322, 352 (Austl.) (discussing section 729 of the Corporations 
Act). 
36 Janssen-Cilag Pty Ltd v Pfizer Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 526 (Austl.); see Caason (2015) 236 
FCR 322. 
37 Distress damages may not be available for corporate plaintiffs. 
38 New South Wales Lotteries Corp Pty Ltd v Kuzmanovski (2011) 195 FCR 234, 253 (Austl.).  
39 Section 237 allows for claims by injured persons and the regulator on behalf of such persons. 
Section 238 allows for compensation orders arising out of other proceedings. Section 239 covers orders 
for non-party consumers.  
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243  Kinds of orders that may be made 
Without limiting section 237(1), 238(1) or 239(1), the orders 
that a court may make under any of those sections against a 
person (the respondent) include all or any of the following: 
(a)  an order declaring the whole or any part of a contract 
made between the respondent and a person (the injured 
person) who suffered, or is likely to suffer, the loss or 
damage referred to in that section, or of a collateral 
arrangement relating to such a contract: 
 (i)  to be void; and 
(ii)  if the court thinks fit—to have been void ab 
initio or void at all times on and after such date as is 
specified in the order (which may be a date that is 
before the date on which the order is made); 
(b)   an order: 
(i)  varying such a contract or arrangement in such 
manner as is specified in the order; and 
(ii)  if the court thinks fit—declaring the contract or 
arrangement to have had effect as so varied on and 
after such date as is specified in the order (which 
may be a date that is before the date on which the 
order is made); 
(c)  an order refusing to enforce any or all of the 
provisions of such a contract or arrangement; 
(d)  an order directing the respondent to refund money 
or return property to the injured person; 
(e)  except if the order is to be made under 
section 239(1)—an order directing the respondent to pay 
the injured person the amount of the loss or damage; 
(f)  an order directing the respondent, at his or her own 
expense, to repair, or provide parts for, goods that had 
been supplied by the respondent to the injured person; 
(g)   an order directing the respondent, at his or her own 
expense, to supply specified services to the injured 
person; 
(h)  an order, in relation to an instrument creating or 
transferring an interest in land, directing the respondent 
to execute an instrument that: 
(i)  varies, or has the effect of varying, the first 
mentioned instrument; or 
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(ii)  terminates or otherwise affects, or has the effect 
of terminating or otherwise affecting, the operation 
or effect of the first mentioned instrument. 
Section 237(2) of the ACL (entitled “Compensation orders etc. on 
application by an injured person or the regulator”) provides that any order 
made under section 243 “must be an order that the court considers will: (a) 
compensate the injured person, or any such injured persons, in whole or in 
part for the loss or damage; or (b) prevent or reduce the loss or damage 
suffered, or likely to be suffered . . .”.40 The repetition of “loss or damage” in 
both subsections might be taken to mean that, as for section 236, the primary 
aim of the orders is compensatory, responding to pecuniary loss arising from 
misleading conduct. But, as we have explained elsewhere,41 this may be an 
unduly narrow understanding of loss or damage in this context. The very 
juxtaposition (through “or”) under section 237(2) of orders that “(a) 
compensate . . . or (b) prevent or reduce” loss or damage, taken together with 
the extension of preventative remedies under (b) to loss or damage “likely” 
to be suffered, suggests that the section as a whole is not restricted to orders 
with a solely compensatory effect. This reading is further supported by the 
range of illustrative orders available under section 243, which expressly 
encompass refund and return orders, which look distinctly restitutionary in 
nature. Finally, if those orders are intended to ensure that meaningful redress 
is afforded to victims of misleading conduct consistent with the instrumental 
and protective aims of the statute, it is highly unlikely that the remedial 
purpose of section 237 can be restricted solely to compensatory awards.42 
Consistently with this view, courts have repeatedly held that the 
principles of equitable rescission provide ready sources of guidance for 
orders made pursuant to section 243 to reverse transactions induced by 
misleading conduct.43 Courts draw on guidance from equitable rescission in 
the operation of section 243 even though the statute nowhere expressly 
adopts the language of rescission.44 This use of the doctrine is practically 
 
40 ACL sections 238–39 are to similar effect.  
41 Exploring the Boundaries of Compensation for Misleading Conduct, supra note 3 at 333–34. 
42 See, e.g., Tenji v Henneberry & Assocs Pty Ltd (2000) 98 FCR 324, 333 [20] (French J) (Austl.): 
Rescission in equity transcends compensation. Avoidance under s 87 must serve a compensatory 
purpose but may serve other purposes in doing justice between the parties. There are cases in which 
a party who enters a contract as a result of misleading or deceptive conduct may be compensated in 
a pecuniary sense by an award of monetary damages but is left nonetheless with a continuing burden 
of unforeseen risk, a transaction soured by the events that surrounded it and a property, once the 
repository of hope for the future that is now an albatross around its neck. 
43 See Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494, 535 (Gummow J); Munchies 
Mgmt Pty Ltd v Belperio (1988) 58 FCR 274, 288 (Fisher, Gummow and Lee JJ) (Austl.); see also Tenji 
(2000) 98 FCR at 329–30 [12] (French J). 
44 The leading case addressing this issue is Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31 
(Black CJ) (Austl.).   
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pertinent in understanding the scope of statutory relief because equitable 
rescission cannot be regarded as compensatory in nature. Equitable rescission 
indubitably operates to effect restitution and counter-restitution of benefits 
conferred pursuant to the impugned transaction. That is, the remedial aim is 
to require the parties to give back (make restitution of)45 benefits received 
from the other, rather than provide compensation as that concept is 
understood in the law of torts. This is demonstrated by the fact that, at general 
law, compensation cannot be sought cumulative upon rescission unless the 
plaintiff pleads and proves the independent tort that supports compensation 
as a remedy.46  
Courts have reconciled the restitutionary nature of orders of rescission 
made under section 243 of the ACL (section 87 of the TPA) with the statutory 
scheme through close analysis of the terms and structure of those provisions 
and the protective purposes of the scheme.47 As they have found, the 
deliberate strategy to separate compensatory orders as of right from the 
discretionary suite points to a more expansive and strongly functional 
conception of “loss or damage” as being the subject of section 237 orders, 
which is required to effect the protective purpose of the statute.48 Early 
decisions suggested that it would be possible to embrace an expansive 
approach to section 236, “giving ‘recover’ the sense of regaining through 
restitution a position lost by the conduct complained of.”49 However, given 
the established approach to section 236 damages, which are awarded as of 
right, the better solution (and one accommodated by the language and 
structure of the remedial scheme) is to adopt this more expansive approach 
under sections 237 and 243. There, the courts’ remedial discretion clearly 
embraces orders akin to rescission, regaining through restitution a position 
lost and thereby “preventing or reducing” the loss or damage suffered 
because of misleading conduct.50  
 
45 Restitution in this sense is distinguished from disgorgement damages or the order following an 
account of profits, which require a defendant to give up defined benefits to the plaintiff, whether or not 
they were transferred from the plaintiff: See JAMES EDELMAN, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES ch. 14, ¶ 14 
(Sweet & Maxwell eds., 20th ed. 2018).  
46 See Sibley v Grosvenor (1916) 21 CLR 469, 475 (Griffith CJ); Elise Bant, Rescission, 
Restitution and Compensation, in EQUITABLE COMPENSATION AND DISGORGEMENT OF PROFIT 277, 281 
n.24 (Simone Degeling & Jason NE Varuhas eds., 2017) (discussing Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1, 
12 (Jessel MR, Lush LJ agreeing at 26)). 
47 The chain of development is addressed in Misleading Conduct Before the Federal Court, supra 
note 3 at 167–68. 
48 See Demagogue (1992) 39 FCR at 33 (Black CJ), 43–44 (Gummow J), 47–48 (Cooper J). 
49 Munchies Mgmt Pty Ltd v Belperio (1988) 58 FCR 274, 287–88 (Fisher, Gummow and Lee JJ) 
(Austl.) (emphasis added), cited with approval in Demagogue (1992) 39 FCR at [61] (Gummow J); Metz 
Holdings Pty Ltd v Simmac Pty Ltd [No 2] (2011) 216 IR 116, 257 [865] (Barker J); see also Karmot Auto 
Spares Pty Ltd v Dominelli Ford (Hurstville) Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 560, 573 [56] (Heerey J). 
50 Munchies (1988) 58 FCR at 287–88 (Fisher, Gummow and Lee JJ). 
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This broad, policy-driven conception of “loss or damage” under section 
237 of the ACL (TPA section 87) permits courts to consider, as relevant 
factors in crafting orders for relief, whether the plaintiff would suffer harm 
in the absence of, or indeed as a result of, the award.51 The particular focus 
of the inquiry, as for equitable rescission, seems to be whether it is possible 
to return the parties to their former positions, in so preventing or reducing 
loss or damage. To that end, for example, courts routinely apply change of 
position-style considerations to protect rescinding plaintiffs from being 
placed without justification (such as plaintiff fault or risk-taking once they 
become aware that the defendant’s conduct was misleading) in a worse 
position than they occupied prior to the impugned transaction.52 Again, there 
remains potential for further interplay between common law and statutory 
developments. For example, while courts have yet to decide whether the 
common law defense extends to non-reliance-based changes of position (so-
called “independent” changes of position”),53 recognition by courts in the 
statutory context that these considerations need to be factored in to avoid 
causing harm consequent on rescission provides an important template of 
reasoning for future common law decisions. 
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW OF REMEDIES 
A number of important and broader implications flow from this analysis. 
For reasons of space, these may be only briefly stated, but they point to an 
important source of evidence informing ideas that hitherto have not, perhaps, 
attracted the attention of remedies scholars to the extent warranted. 
It will have been observed that the statutory prohibition on misleading 
conduct is separated both structurally and normatively from the remedial 
consequences of its contravention. Thus, as we have seen, defendant fault is 
irrelevant to the primary issue of contravention for the purposes of section 18 
of the ACL, found in Chapter 2. By contrast, the fault of both parties strongly 
informs the remedial inquiry following a finding of contravention, both in 
relation to regulator actions and to private claims for redress, made under 
Chapter 5 “Enforcement and Remedies.”54 We have also seen that the statute 
 
51 See, e.g., id. at 287–89; Akron Sec Ltd v Iliffe (1997) 41 NSWLR 353, 364 (Mason P) (Austl.). 
52 The same change of position considerations are also at work in equitable rescission: see, e.g., 
Coastal Estates Pty Ltd v Melevende [1965] VR 433, 440–41 (Sholl J) (Austl.); Bant, supra note 46, at 
277, 288–90, 298. 
53 Australian Fin Serv & Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Indus Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 560 (Austl.); see also 
ELISE BANT, THE CHANGE OF POSITION DEFENCE 143–60 (Hart 2009). 
54 Limitations on Defendant Liability for Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Under Statute, supra 
note 3; Jeannie M. Paterson & Elise Bant, Intuitive Synthesis and Fidelity to Purpose?: Judicial 
Interpretation of the Discretionary Power to Award Civil Penalties Under the Australian Consumer Law, 
in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN PRIVATE LAW 154, 175 (Prue Vines & Scott Donald eds., Federation 
Press 2019). 
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expressly recognizes and gives effect to the role of judicial discretion in 
awarding remedies in response to contraventions of the primary prohibitions. 
Finally, the statutory schemes dominate the private law landscape in a 
manner that demands their close consideration alongside, and in conjunction 
with, their common law counterparts. These features feed in to and may 
properly inform broader debates about the nature and role of private law 
remedies not merely within Australia, but within other jurisdictions sharing 
a common law tradition. 
The first area of debate relates to the forms of harm that are the subject 
of orders for compensation. Eric Descheemaeker has persuasively posited 
that the law of torts contains two different and mutually incompatible 
conceptions of harm: a “bipolar” model of harm wrongfully caused, which 
focusses on the extent to which a person is left financially or emotionally 
worse off because of the defendant’s wrongdoing, and a “unipolar” model in 
which the very infringement of the plaintiff’s right is itself considered the 
harm to be compensated. Adopting that distinction for present purposes, 
recent years have seen a significant surge of interest in, and support for, 
rights-based or unipolar conceptions of harm.55 These appear to supply a 
particularly cogent basis for awarding compensation in cases where it is 
difficult or impossible to identify actual (financial or emotional) harm caused 
by the defendant’s wrongdoing and, yet, it is clear that some remedy or relief 
ought to be granted.56 Hence a consequence of rights-based models of harm 
is to re-establish the principled dominance of compensation as the primary 
remedy for torts, sidelining and delegitimizing alternatives such as 
restitutionary and exemplary damages. A striking and recent example is the 
UK Supreme Court case of One Step (Support) Ltd. v. Morris-Garner57 in 
which Lord Reed (with whom Lady Hale, Lord Wilson and Lord Carnwath 
agreed) characterized “user damages” (or, as Lord Reed preferred, 
“negotiating damages”) as: 
providing compensation for loss, albeit not loss of a 
conventional kind. Where property is damaged, the loss 
suffered can be measured in terms of the cost of repair or the 
diminution in value, and damages can be assessed 
accordingly. Where on the other hand an unlawful use is 
made of property, and the right to control such use is a 
valuable asset, the owner suffers a loss of a different kind, 
which calls for a different method of assessing damages. In 
 
55 Eric Descheemaeker, Unravelling Harms in Tort Law, 132 L.Q. REV. 595 (2016). 
56 For example, in the context of user damages: David J. Brennan, The Beautiful Restitutionary 
Heresy of a Larrikin, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 209, 219–25 (2011); Mitchell McInnes, Gain, Loss and the User 
Principle, 14 RESTITUTION L. REV. 76, 85 (2006); cf. Kit Barker, Damages ‘Without Loss’: Can Hohfeld 
Help?, 34 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 631(2014). 
57 One Step (Support) Ltd. v. Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649. 
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such circumstances, the person who makes wrongful use of 
the property prevents the owner from exercising his right to 
obtain the economic value of the use in question, and should 
therefore compensate him for the consequent loss. Put 
shortly, he takes something for nothing, for which the owner 
was entitled to require payment.58 
And subsequently: 
The claimant has in substance been deprived of a valuable 
asset and his loss can therefore be measured by determining 
the economic value of the asset in question. The defendant 
has taken something for nothing, for which the claimant was 
entitled to payment.59 
This reasoning enabled the Court to reject restitutionary damages as 
necessary or appropriate on the facts of the case, although the Court did not 
shut the door entirely on the possibility of those damages in some, 
presumably exceptional, cases (and, indeed, the Court’s repeated emphasis 
on “taking something for nothing” points strongly to the fact of enrichment 
in these cases). The Singapore Court of Appeal has similarly adopted a 
compensatory analysis of user damages in the recent case of Turf Club Auto 
Emporium Pte Ltd. v. Yeo Boong Hua.60 In that case, the Court characterized 
the harm to be compensated as the loss of rights, rather than actual loss, albeit 
the amount of loss is calculated by reference to a restitutionary measure. 
In this context, it is striking that the primary Australian statutory 
prohibition on misleading conduct and its associated remedial scheme is 
entirely consistent with Descheemaeker’s conception of bipolar harm. 
Indeed, a bipolar analysis may fairly be considered to be mandated by both 
the language and structure of the statutes. It would be very difficult to see any 
reason for the repeated legislative designs that structurally separate wrong 
from remedy if they were one and the same, nor to adopt the mandated 
requirements of causation and separate identification of “loss or damage” that 
characterize both section 236 and sections 237/243 orders and their 
counterparts. As we have seen above, this dualist position has been confirmed 
by the courts’ identification of loss under section 236 ACL as entailing 
“actual” rather than normative loss. The same must follow for sections 
237/243 orders, albeit the focus in some cases will be on preventing or 
reducing actual harm by returning the parties to their former positions.61  
 
58 Id. at [30] (emphasis added); see also Bunnings Grp Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 
NSWLR 420. 
59 Morris-Garner [2018] UKSC 20, [2019] AC 649 [92]; see also id. at [94]–[95] (points (1) and 
(10)). 
60 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd. v. Yeo Boong Hua [2018] SGCA 44, [210]–[215] (Sing.). 
61 Exploring the Boundaries of Compensation for Misleading Conduct, supra note 3. 
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Indeed, it is arguable that the statutory scheme under the ACL (and 
equivalents) does not even conform to Hohfeld’s famous distinction between 
rights and obligations, which has such a powerful influence over rights-based 
theories of remedies. The statutory prohibition confers no corresponding 
right on private litigants unless and until there is (actual) harm suffered 
because of its contravention. It is a statutory norm that, when contravened, 
triggers a range of regulatory responses and which, only when causative of 
actual loss or damage, attracts private rights of redress. Notwithstanding this 
seemingly radical diversion from orthodoxy, the scheme seems intuitively 
familiar and highly workable in practice in a jurisdiction steeped in the 
common law tradition. All of this suggests that doubt can and should be held 
in respect of any claim of the incontestable and singular truth of rights-based 
analysis. 
Alongside and informing this debate, is a second strand of disagreement 
about the nature of the relationship between right and remedy and, in 
particular, the proper role of courts in awarding relief. As is well-known, at 
one end of the spectrum is a “monist” vision of right and remedy, in which 
the two are inextricably connected.62 To adapt Peter Birks’ memorable 
phrase, on this account a remedy is a right “contemplated from the other 
end.”63 Clearly there is a strong (although not essential)64 connection between 
this understanding of remedies and rights-based theories of harm and 
compensation. On a monist account, there is very little room for judicial 
discretion in the award of relief: the nature of the right dictates the form and 
measure of relief. An example is the view that a plaintiff’s contractual right 
can be defined in terms of the defendant’s obligation to perform or pay 
compensation for the loss of the right to performance. The plaintiff’s 
entitlement “as of right” is to performance or compensation. At the other end 
of the spectrum of theories concerning rights and remedies is a “dualist” 
account, which separates functionally and analytically the roles of right and 
remedy. In this school of thought, once a right has been breached, a range of 
considerations arise that can and should guide the legitimate use of judicial 
 
62 Grant Hammond, Rethinking Remedies: The Changing Nature of the Conception of the 
Relationship Between Legal and Equitable Remedies, in REMEDIES: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (Jeffrey 
Berryman ed., 1991).  
63 Peter Birks, The Law of Restitution at the End of an Epoch, 28 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 13, 55 
(1999) [hereinafter The Law of Restitution at the End of an Epoch]; see also Peter Birks, Definition and 
Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13, in THE CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 3, 24 (Peter Birks ed., 
1997) (“The secondary obligation to pay such compensatory damages is . . . the same thing as the right, 
looked at from the other end.”). 
64 Birks, himself, famously argued for the end of the “false monopoly” of compensation and 
recognition of the proper role for punitive and gain-based relief. The Law of Restitution at the End of an 
Epoch, supra note 63, at 52–54. For Birks, the challenge lay in identifying with sufficient clarity the 
conditions for their award, thereby restricting, if not eliminating entirely, the role of judicial discretion. 
See, e.g., Peter Birks, Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism, 29 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 
1, 1 (2000). 
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discretion in the award and measure of remedy. A moderate form of this 
school of thought does not demand that the law of remedies degenerate 
entirely into instances of individuated justice, but does acknowledge and 
defend the exercise of judgement by courts in actively crafting relief.65 That 
is the species of dualism that seem to have taken root in Australian remedial 
jurisprudence. 
The TPA and the ACL have, in this regard, had a subtle but potentially 
profound influence. As Paul Finn has rightly noted, the pervasive statutory 
context encourages discretion and flexibility in the award of remedies under 
the general law: “. . . liability and remedy have been uncoupled. This . . . 
reflects the “basket” approach to remedy taken in modern statutes at least in 
Australia, as for example, in . . . [the ACL].”66 Finn identifies the remedial 
constructive trust and the dramatical revival of equitable compensation as 
examples of Australia’s distinctive law of remedies which, one could argue, 
strongly reflect this “dualist” and discretionary approach. As we have seen, 
to this list one could readily add partial rescission and proportionate 
responses to equitable estoppel.67  
The short point from the foregoing analysis is that the structural and 
normative separation between right and remedy under the ACL and related 
statutory schemes has made Australia relatively sterile ground for the sorts 
of monist and rights-based theories that assert a direct and inviolable 
connection between right and (usually compensatory) remedy. The same may 
be said for attempts to sterilise judicial discretion in the award of relief.  
Finally, reference must be had, albeit briefly, to the ongoing debates 
between corrective justice and distributive justice theorists, which are 
concerned to map and guide judicial reasoning in private law disputes. For 
present purposes, these schools of thought are relevant as identifying the sorts 
of reasons that courts should or should not consider in the award of relief. 
While there are, again, numerous visions of each (and there are plenty of 
scholars and judges who think that both forms of justice can and should 
simultaneously occupy the legal stage), corrective justice is commonly 
understood as demanding that any remedial discretion on the part of a judge 
 
65 Wright has memorably described the relationship as “sticky”: the remedy necessarily 
responding to and reflecting the nature of the claim to which it relates. David Wright, Wrong and Remedy: 
A Sticky Relationship, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2001); see also Kit Barker, Rescuing Remedialism in 
Unjust Enrichment Law: Why Remedies Are Right, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 301, 323 (1998) (noting the deeply 
“reflexive” relationship between remedy and right); Paul Finn, Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in 
Remedies, in EQUITABLE DOCTRINE AND DISCRETION IN REMEDIES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GARETH 
JONES 251, 267 (1998). 
66 Paul Finn, Unity, Then Divergence: The Privy Council, the Common Law of England and the 
Common Laws of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in THE COMMON LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: 
DIVERGENCE AND UNITY 37, 56–57 (Andrew Robertson & Michael Tilbury eds., 2016); see also Paul 
Finn, Common Law Divergences, 37 MELB. U. L. REV. 509, 531–32 (2013). 
67 See, e.g., Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101, 113 (Austl.). 
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is and should be circumscribed to considerations relevant to the interests of 
the immediate parties to the dispute. That is, the reasoning that supports 
liability must match the inherent correlative structure of liability itself, which 
focuses solely on the relationship between plaintiff and defendant.68 It 
follows that considerations external to that correlative relationship (for 
example, third party interests or questions of public benefit) are foreign to 
the inquiry and can only serve to undermine corrective justice. On a 
distributive account, by contrast, broader considerations of public interests 
and benefits may also play a legitimate role in informing relief. These are 
also sometimes called “instrumental” conceptions of private law, as they see 
a legitimate role, consequence and even purpose for the law in promoting 
certain beneficial societal ends. 
In Australia, any strict corrective justice account must grapple with the 
reality of a legal system dominated by legislation with instrumental purposes 
that expresses fundamental community norms and values to which statutory 
and, arguably, general law principles must conform in the pursuit of greater 
public goods. These fundamental norms include the prohibition on 
misleading or deceptive conduct, as well as other fundamental values such as 
the norm against unconscionable conduct. These arguably set the baseline 
against which general law standards such as “reasonableness” must be 
assessed.69 The statutory schemes also irrevocably position the required 
commercial standards of conduct and their related remedial frameworks in 
the context of wider public interests or ends. This inevitably affects and 
reflects community expectations in a way that must inform the operation of 
related general law principles.70 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the analysis offered in this paper might seem limited to a specific 
and, perhaps, idiosyncratic jurisdiction, there are, arguably, wider lessons to 
be had from the exercise. In particular, the analysis challenges rights-based 
theorists to take statute seriously. It also invites them to acknowledge a more 
plural account of the common law world. Australia is unlikely to abandon, 
be divorced from, or betray its common law heritage because of the 
development of its overarching statutory regimes. After all, the statutory 
regimes were born within and reflect an understanding of common law rights 
and remedies and a conception of the valid role of private law. The charge 
 
68 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 114–15 (1995). 
69 As discussed in the context of estoppel and misleading conduct. Estoppel, Misleading Conduct 
and Equitable Fraud, supra note 3. 
70 Dir of Consumer Affairs Vict v Scully (2013) 303 ALR 168, 186 (Santamaria JA, Neave and 
Osborn JJA, concurring) (Austl.) (citing Australian Competition & Consumer Comm’n v Lux Distribs Pty 
Ltd [2013] ATPR 42–447, 43–463, ¶ 23); see also Bant, supra note 24, at 388. 
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that a legitimate common law system can only be understood and applied in 
rights-based terms must at least pause, if not falter, in the face of a 
sophisticated jurisdiction seeking to develop a principled, dualist and 
discretionary approach to right and remedy, in which remedies operate 
actively and appropriately to promote the many purposes of the law.  
 
